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EDITORIAL COMMENT
Guilty or Not Guilty?
A very interesting case has been brought to the attention of the
editorial staff of the REVIEW, namely, Manna vs. State, 179 Wis.
384; 192 N. W. 160.
On November 19th, 1920, Dominic Manna was found guilty of
murder in the first degree for having feloniously and with malice
aforethought shot and killed August Folcinelli on the sixth day of
February, 1920, at the Lake Shore Stone Quarry in Ozaukee County.
Persons who have interested themselves in this case are desirous
of presenting the salient facts in it for the consideration of those men
and women in the State of Wisconsin who are concerned with justice
and are students of the law, that they may form an intelligent opinion
as to whether or not the whole record in the case proved Dominic
Manna guilty or innocent. It has been eleven years now since Manna
was committed to the State Penitentiary at Waupun, Wisconsin, for
murder in the first degree, and throughout all that time he has constantly protested his innocence.
This case has been referred to the class in Criminal Law at Marquette Law School for investigation under the leadership of Professor
F. X. Swietlik. I do not desire to submit to you a lengthy legal argument based upon the facts in the case, for the case is already res
adjudicata, and Manna was represented by able counsel. It is clearly
understood that the only remedy now, if there is or should be one, is
executive clemency.
At the very outset, the REVIEW wishes it understood that it desires to avoid any appearance of disrespect of the Supreme Court, in
presenting this case for the attention of its readers, so that a well
considered opinion may be determined as to whether or not Manna
was guilty of the murder of Folcinelli. In such a presentation we are
free to go outside of the record of the trial. If Manna is innocent, it
means that his incarceration in the State prison has been a mistake;
but, on the other hand, if his sentence was just, then the question is
settled, even on any request for pardon.
Testimony revealed the fact that Manna, hereinafter called the
defendant, was a single man of Italian birth who came to this country
in 1906. He was a workman at the Lake Shore Quarry near Port
Washington, Wisconsin, since 1906, and had established a good reputation. At the Quarry he met Folcinelli, also Italian by birth, who was
then unmarried, but shortly after their meeting, in 1909, Folcinelli
married. Evidence showed that the two men had been close friends
throughout the years, until the day before the shooting, when the defendant helped Folcinelli kill a pig.
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At noon on the day of the shooting, defendant left the engine room
of the Quarry following ten or fifteen feet behind Folcinelli on the
road leading from the Quarry. The only words spoken by the men
were when Folcinelli looked back at the defendant and said, "if I see
any crows". At this point defendant was about two feet from the
Railroad tracks which crosses the road both men were traversing.
Defendant stepped over the first rail of the track, slipped and fell,
according to his testimony, and the gun struck the ground in such a
way as to discharge both barrels. Bear in mind that the gun which
defendant had been carrying had been for a long time in his possession, and the shells in the gun had been in it for several weeks or
more, and the further fact that Manna had been walking through
deep snow. As to whether or not the gun barrels were dampened
and wet as a consequence of their exposure to moisture, no one
knows. It is certain that all these facts must influence the spread of
the shot, which testimony showed to be erratic.
After the fall and the discharge of the gun defendant got up and
immediately saw Folcinelli to the South on the Railroad at its junction
with a side path. At this time Folcinelli was facing the defendant and
staggered backward until he fell. Defendant then left his gun where
it lay and hurried back to the machine shop to inform authorities there
that he had fallen on the Railroad tracks and accidently shot Folcinelli. He then left for Port Washington to surrender to the authorities. The body of Folcinelli was left in the same position as it fell,
until the coroner and sheriff came about two o'clock in the afternoon.
After defendant reported the occurrence to the authorities he was
permited to go free for three or four days without bail, when a warrant was sworn out for his arrest.
There were certain irregularities which were brought out during
the conduct of the trial which raise a serious doubt as to whether or
not they should be treated as reversible error. The Supreme Court
solemnly found that the rights of the defendant were not prejudiced
by these irregularities, which were deemed immaterial. The Supreme
Court then went into a consideration of these irregularities as forming grounds for a new trial, which defendant's counsel contended, as
based upon Stats., 1923, Sec. 3072m, now Sec. 274.37, Stats., 1929,
which reads as follows:
"No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted
in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of jury, or the improper admission of evidence, or for error
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the
court to which the application is made, after an examination of the
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained
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of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse
or set aside the judgment, or to secure the new trial."
The trial court at the bottom of page 4 of his instructions to the
jury said as follows:
"The defendant comes into court and enters upon his trial with
the presumption of innocence in his favor and this presumption of
innocence attends the defendant from the beginning of the trial to the
end thereof and prevails and must prevail unless overcome by evidence
sufficiently strong and convincing to satisfy you of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt".
Counsel for defendant contended that the presumption of innocence attends the defendant from the beginning of the trial to the
end thereof and until all the evidence is in and the arguments of
counsel have been made and instructions given to the jury, citing
numerous cases.
It was further contended that the instructions as given to the jury
were fatal to the verdict. The Supreme Court however submitted that
this charge was not erroneous, because the jury were elsewhere repeatedly warned that they could not find a verdict of guilty unless'
convinced of the truth of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, which
was defined.
The evidence relating to improper conduct between defendant and
decedent's wife some time before the shooting as related by one witness
was admitted against defendant's objection. This witness was drunk
while conversing with defendant about his relations with Mrs. Folcinelli. He stated that defendant did not reply to his question, but nowhere during the argument of the prosecution was it shown why the
defendant should answer the intoxicated witness.
By consent of counsel for defendant the jurors were allowed to
separate over Sunday, but only in charge of an officer. On such
an occasion one of the jurors, while cranking his automobile broke
his wrist. For a few minutes he became separated from the officers
in procuring and submiting to surgical treatment. The Surgeon who
treated him was a witness for the State. Counsel for defendant submitted that the separation of this juror without the presence of an
officer was reversible error; but it was held by the court that this fact
was inconsequential and that there was no prejudicial error on this
account. Defense counsel declared that no motive for the killing was
proved, and in fact a motive if any was doubtful; yet the court held
that it was unnecessary to establish a motive for a homicide when the
facts of the shooting are fully proven, since the jury can presume
motive if they conclude from those facts that the shooting was not
accidental. It was asserted by the defense that the defendant did not
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have a fair trial because of prejudice against his race, but there seemed
to have been no difficulty in the procuring of a jury, and furthermore,
the district attorney and sheriff, who were friendly to the defendant,
permitted him to go free on hearing his own version of the killing,
and did not arrest him until further facts had been disclosed. It is,
however, strongly urged that the conviction in this case was largely
the result of racial prejudice against the defendant, which was existent
at the time of trial.
The LAW REVIEW upon request opens its columns to a consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, and
urges that the case be examined 9nce more by the "Court of Pardons"
to determine the innocence or guilt of Dominic Manna. If Manna is
guilty as was found, then the matter is closed once and for all. But,
if he did not receive a fair and impartial trial, if the court erred in
refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty, if the court erred in its instructions to the jury, if there was no motive, since the testimony is
circumstantial and weak, then the matter should be gone into thoroughly and a petition filed with the governor to finally determine
whether Manna's incarceration in State's prison is for a crime which
he did not commit. It is hoped that clubs or -organizations looking for
something to do will decide to investigate the facts surrounding this
occurrence, which is still claimed to be accidental.
CARL F.

ZEIDLER.

PracticingLawyers as Teachers.
One of the most important problems confronting the newly Admitted member of the bar is bridging the gap from theory to practice.
Too often the young attorney finds himself unable to make practical
application of the vast store of legal principles, the knowledge of
which he has so laboriously acquired. The logical remedy for this
difficulty would seem to lie in the method of teaching the law; yet we
find that during the past twenty years a powerful group of theorists
on the faculties of some of the oldest law schools have developed a
policy of banishing from the faculties of these schools men actively
engaged in the practice of law and substituting in their places those
who are trained in legal theory only: men, who have never practiced.
With the view of combating this situation, a resolution was presented at the meeting of the Section of Legal Education of the American Bar Association held last August in Chicago, which read as fol.lows: "Resolved that every approved law school shall have among
its teachers a sufficient number of practicing lawyers, or lawyers who
have had at least ten years experience at the bar, to insure actual
personal acquaintance and influence with the whole student body, in

